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McGee: Real Property/Land Use Law - Keeping Tahoe Blue: An Ecological Al

REAL PROPERTY/LAND USE LAW - Keeping Tahoe Blue: An Ecological Alternative to the Penn Central Test. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
INTRODUCTION

In the early 1980s, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), an
agency whose mandate was to "coordinate and regulate development in the
[Tahoe] Basin and to conserve its natural resources," issued two temporary
regulations that prohibited development on certain sensitive lands.' In response, property owners of these sensitive parcels alleged that the regulations, which together resulted in a thirty-two month moratorium on development, constituted takings without just compensation.' After nearly twenty
years of litigation in the lower courts, the Supreme Court's decision resolves
this dispute, not by creating a new categorical rule as the property owners
3
advocated, but by embracing the familiar regulatory takings balancing test.
Lake Tahoe, a high alpine lake on the border of California and Nevada, is renowned for its unique characteristics. 4 Not only is it one of the
world's largest and deepest lakes, but also its clear, blue water distinguishes

it from most others.5 The lake's clarity results from its historic lack of nutri-

ents and the relative uniformity of its water temperature. 6 Unfortunately, its
legendary clarity has been in a state of decline for over fifty years due to
eutrophication, a process by which soil erosion into the lake creates an increase in nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus.7 These nutrients cause
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1.
1471 (2002) (quoting Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 394 (1979)). The California and Nevada legislatures created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency through the passage of the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact of 1969, which
Congress later approved. Id. For the statutes themselves, see 1968 Cal. Stats., ch. 998,
p.1900, §1; 1968 Nev. Stats. 4. Id. Congress approved these statutes in 1969, Pub. L. 91148, 83 Stat. 360. Id.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1473.
2.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The
3.
Penn Central analysis, the three-pronged balancing test the Court uses to determine whether a
regulatory taking has occurred, is not a categorical rule, but a framework used to decide cases
on an ad hoc factual basis. Id.; see also infra note 57 and accompanying text for the elements
of the test.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 766
4.
(9th Cir. 2000).
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1471 n.2 (citing S. Rep. No. 91-510, pp.3-4 (1969); ex5.
plaining: "Only two other sizeable lakes in the world are of comparable quality--Crater Lake
in Oregon, which is protected as part of the Crater Lake National Park, and Lake Baikal in the
[former] Soviet Union.").
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1471.
6.

7.

Id. See NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 1064-65 (3d. ed. 1993). Oligotrophic lakes, like

Lake Tahoe, are characteristically deep, clear, nutrient-poor, and contain high amounts of
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algae overgrowth and oxygen depletion, which destroy the clarity of the water and threaten the viability of fish and other animals residing in and around
the lake.8 The initial cause of this increased erosion was rapid residential
development around the popular lake, which necessitated a removal of vegetation to make way for the construction of roads and homes. 9 As the Court
notes, "The
Lake's unsurpassed beauty, it seems, is the wellspring of its un10
doing."
In the early 1970s, TRPA devised a land classification system in an
effort to address the reality that certain kinds of property, if developed, were
more apt to contribute to nutrient loading than others."' In this system, tracts
of land were assigned a "class" based on "levels of use that the land was
capable of tolerating without sustaining such permanent damage as erosion
and water degradation."' 2 Extremely sensitive stream parcels were labeled
"Stream Environment Zones" (SEZs). 3 Other tracts that were particularly
susceptible to "hazards [such] as floods, landslides, high water tables, poorly
drained soils, fragile flora and fauna and easily erodible soils" were given a
number between 1 and 3, while less hazardous tracts received ratings between 4 and 7.14 During this time, TRPA was largely unsuccessful in prooxygen all year. Id. They also have fairly non-productive phytoplankton, including algae and
cyanobacteria. Id. Eutrophic lakes on the other hand, are typically shallower, murky, contain
a greater amount of nutrients, possess productive phytoplankon, and are less oxygen-rich in
the summer. Id. Eutrophication is the process by which a lake changes from oligotrophic to
eutrophic conditions. Id. These changes can occur naturally over long periods of time as
runoff increases a lake's mineral and nutrient content, or can be hastened by human activities.
Id.; see also DOUGLAS H. STRONG, TAHOE: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 112 (1984)
("[N]utrients did enter Tahoe, not only from sewage wastes, but from the runoff generated by
increased disturbance of the mountain slopes, caused by land clearance for buildings and by
cutting and filling for roads.").
8.
Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 767. See STRONG supra note 7, at 7. "More than three
hundred species of wildlife still inhabit the basin, although several are now listed as rare or
endangered. The peregrine falcon and the wolverine, among others, no longer reside in the
basin because of the deterioration of their habitat." Id.
9.
Tahoe-Sierra,216 F.3d at 767.
10.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1471.
11.
Id. at 1472.
12.
Id.
13.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'i Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1231 (D. Nev. 1999).
[C]ertain areas near streams and other wetlands - as Stream Environment
Zones ('SEZs') - act as filters for much of the debris that runoff carries.
When SEZ lands are filled in and paved over, however, they cease to perform their natural function. Thus not only do the paved-over SEZ lands
increase erosion due to the new impervious coverage, they also fail to
mitigate erosion occurring at higher elevations farther from the lake. SEZ
lands are therefore considered especially sensitive to the impact of
development.
Id.
14.

See STRONG supra note 7, at 151.
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hibiting the development activities that threatened Lake Tahoe.' 5 As a result, in 1980, the California and Nevada legislatures ultimately amended the
1969 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact that had created TRPA in order to
redefine the agency's mandate. 16 The revised Compact required the agency,
inter alia, to develop and adopt a regional land use plan in accordance with
environmental threshold carrying capacities by June 1983."7
In 1981, TRPA enacted Ordinance 81-5, the first of the two regulations in dispute, which essentially forbade development on SEZ and class 13 lands until TRPA could develop this regional plan. 8 Failing to adopt the
plan by its June 1983 deadline, TRPA then issued Resolution 83-21, basically an extension of the first regulation, which "completely suspended all
project reviews and approvals, including the acceptance of new proposals"
on SEZ and class 1-3 lands.' 9 Together, Ordinance 85-1 and Resolution 83-

In this classification system, 76 percent of all land in the Tahoe Basin was
listed 'high hazard,' 10 percent 'moderate hazard,' and 14 percent 'low
hazard.' When applied to proposed development, this meant that little or
no construction should take place on slopes that were subject to erosion or
were in marsh or meadowland.
Id. In reality, this classification system, which aimed to curb development in especially sensitive areas, actually "allowed numerous exceptions." Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1472. See STRONG supra note 7, at 156 ("The Governing
15.
Body approved so many new developments during the period of preparation of the plan reportedly 95 percent of the projects brought before it - that rapid growth was assured for
years to come."). See also Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233 ("It became evident that the
environment was continuing to decline, and that the 1969 Compact was not strong enough to
fix the problem.").
Tahoe-Sierra, 121 S. Ct. at 1472; Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233 ("The 1980
16.
...).
Compact restructured TRPA and its voting procedures.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1472. See STRONG supra note 7, at 193 (explaining that
17.
TRPA adopted strict "threshold standards for water and air quality, soil conservation, vegetation, noise, wildlife, fisheries, recreation and scenic resources" as part of the regional plan in
order to curb the kinds of "development [that] would produce undesirable and unacceptable
environmental damage in the basin").
Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1234 (stating that although sections 16 and 3 of Ordi18.
nance 85-1 are similarly worded, more exceptions existed for owners of class 1-3 parcel than
for SEZ owners). TRPA Ordinance 85-1, §16.00 states:
Except as otherwise provided by this ordinance, no person shall perform
any construction, work, use or activity, including without limitation, grading, clearing, removal of vegetation, filling or creation of land coverage,
upon land within land capability districts la, Ic, 2 and 3 without first obtaining a permit from the Agency.
TRPA Ordinance 85-1 §16.00 (June 25, 1981) (amending §12.00 of Ordinance 79-10). See
also TRPA Ordinance 85-1, §3.00 (June 25, 1981) (amending §13.00 of Ordinance 79-10);
Tahoe-Sierra,34 F. Supp. 2d at 1234 ("[N]o person shall perform any construction, work, use
or activity upon a lot or parcel containing an SEZ without first obtaining a permit from the
Agency .... ").
Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
19.
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21 disallowed all development on these sensitive parcels for 32 months.20
TRPA adopted the regional plan in 1984.21 On the same day of the plan's
adoption, however, California sued TRPA to prevent the plan's implementation on the grounds that it "failed to establish land-use controls sufficiently
stringent to protect the [Tahoe] Basin. 22 The District Court of California
agreed and issued an injunction that remained in effect until TRPA implemented a new plan in 1987.23
Not long after TRPA adopted the 1984 plan, petitioners (property
owners in the Tahoe Basin, some of whom were represented by a non-profit
membership corporation, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council) filed suit in
both the Nevada and California district courts claiming that the two regulations and the 1984 plan constituted takings, which required just compensation. 2' Eventually the cases were consolidated in the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada. 25 The court dismissed all takings claims
regarding the 1984 plan, finding that it was the injunction and not the plan
itself that caused any injury after 1984.26 Focusing on Ordinance 81-5 and
Resolution 83-21, the court used the Penn Central and Lucas analyses to
address whether the moratoria had effected a partial or total taking, depriving the owners of economically viable use of their land.27 The district court
concluded that no taking had occurred under a Penn Central analysis.2" Under a Lucas analysis, however, the court found that petitioners had been
temporarily deprived of "all economically viable use of their land," which
amounted to a categorical taking.29
On appeal, petitioners opted to challenge only the court's dismissal
of the claims regarding the 1984 plan, and did not refute the court's decision
20.
21.
22.
23.

Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1473.
Id.
Id.
Id.

24.

Id.; see also DOUGLAS H. STRONG, TAHOE FROM TIMBER BARONS To ECOLOGISTS 86

(1984) (explaining that the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council is a group that represented the
private property interests of some of the basin's landowners). Property owners, frustrated by
TRPA's restrictive regional plan, claimed that their land use was limited to such a degree as
to amount to takings. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1473.
25.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Sierra Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp.
2d 1226 (D. Nev. 1999).
26.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1473.
27.
Id. at 1474 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d. at 1239). See also Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (the Nevada District Court cited this regulatory takings
case to determine that a taking occurs when a regulation either does not "substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land")
(citations omitted)).
28.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1475. See infra note 57 and accompanying text for the
elements of the Penn Centraltest.
29.
Id. (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992)
(quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260)).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss2/12

4

McGee: Real Property/Land Use Law - Keeping Tahoe Blue: An Ecological Al

2003

CASE NOTE

3
that no taking had occurred under a Penn Central analysis. " TRPA chal3
A
lenged the court's application of the Lucas analysis on cross-appeal.
panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's ruling that the 1984 plan was not at issue and was left only
with the question: "[W]hether the mere enactment of the regulations constituted a taking" under a Lucas analysis.32 On this issue it reversed, reasoning
that property rights should be regarded in their entirety, not as temporal
slices of a whole, and as such, the landowners were not denied all economic
use of their property.33

The question before the Supreme Court was similarly narrow, as petitioners attacked the regulations on their face and advocated for a categorical rule. 4 The Court's decision to affirm, therefore, is not surprising be35
cause these facial challenges tend to "face an uphill battle." A six-Justice
majority declined to endorse a categorical rule, explaining that "the interest
in 'fairness and justice' will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn
Central approach when deciding cases like this ... "36 The Court also
noted, "In rejecting petitioners' per se rule, we do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking;
that it should not be given exclusive significance one
we simply recognize
37
way or the other.,
This case note will explore the problematic law of regulatory takings. Specifically, it will argue that the first two prongs of the Penn Central
test are contributing factors to the current uncertainty within regulatory takings jurisprudence and are inadequate standards with which to challenge an
environmental or land use regulation. State legislation that would expand
traditional common law nuisance principles to include harm to the environment coupled with a judicial focus on what is now the third prong of the
Penn Central test (the character of the governmental regulation) provide an
alternative test that is both practically and ecologically sound.

30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1476.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1476-77.
33.
34. Id. at 1477. Petitioners argued: "[T]he mere enactment of a temporary regulation
that, while in effect, denies a property owner all viable use of her property gives rise to an
unqualified constitutional obligation to compensate her for the value of its use during that
period." Id.

35.

Id. (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495

(1987)).

36.
37.

Id. at 1489.
Id. at 1486.
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BACKGROUND

The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation," refers to the government's physical appropriation of private property.3" Although no explicit
language in this clause contemplates what are now known as regulatory takings, the Court has acknowledged that regulations barring property owners
from using their property in certain ways can similarly amount to takings
requiring compensation.39 Courts can remedy physical takings claims by
applying categorical rules; however, regulatory takings cases do not lend
themselves to such a simple assessment and are almost always subject to an
"ad hoc balancing test."4 Inherent in this balancing test are factors the
Court may consider, but by the Court's own admission, "Resolution of each
case ... ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic."'"
Five cases, spanning nearly eighty-five years of Supreme Court history, lay much of the foundation for regulatory takings jurisprudence today:
1) Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon; 2) Penn Central TransportationCo. v.
City of New York; 3) Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis; 4)
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council; and 5) First English Evangelical
4 2 The
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California.
Court's
continued reliance on these cases for precedent, and its reluctance to change
what it contends is the best approach for regulatory takings claims, warrant
discussion of each.43 In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court clarified its holdings in
Lucas and First English, the two cases petitioners relied on to support their
argument, and reaffirmed the importance of the Penn Centralanalysis as the
reigning test for regulatory takings today. 44
The Court first established the concept of regulatory takings in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.45 It would be a rare occurrence to read a
regulatory takings opinion today without finding some mention of this semi38.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478.
40.
Id. Physical takings cases are easier to assess with categorical rules because property
is actually appropriated by the government for its own use. In regulatory takings cases, the
property is not usurped, but the uses of it are restricted by governmental legislation or regulation. Id. at 1478-80.
41.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
42.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); First
English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
43.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1477-89 (2002).
44.
Id. at 1478.
45.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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nal case.46 Indeed, because of the indeterminate nature of the test that the
Court created, this case has continued to fuel commentary for decades after
its decision."
In 1921, Pennsylvania passed the Kohler Act, which prohibited coal
mining in areas where certain surrounding, developed, surface properties
were at risk of subsidence.48 At the time of this dispute, Pennsylvania recognized three distinct estates in property: Surface, mineral and support estates.49 The Mahons, owners only of surface property rights, sought to prevent Pennsylvania Coal from mining under their home by calling upon the
Kohler Act.5 ° Pennsylvania Coal owned the mineral and support estates in
question and challenged the Act on its face, claiming that if it were prohibited from mining, the regulation would amount to a taking of its property."
The majority held the Kohler Act unconstitutional.52 The Court first
established the balancing test for regulatory takings with the "general rule"
that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking."" The Court did not directly answer the obvious next question of what kind of regulation goes "too far."
Instead, it explained that it is a "question of degree - and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions."54 Thus, this case established the concept of regulatory takings, but left largely uncertain the question of what
kind of future regulations would constitute takings.
Nearly sixty years after Pennsylvania Coal, the Court was faced
a regulatory takings question. In Penn Central Transportation
with
again
Co. v. City of New York, owners of the historic Grand Central Terminal challenged New York's Landmarks Preservation Law, which denied them the
right to build offices above the terminal. 55 Terminal owners claimed that the
city's regulation had "taken" their property without just compensation.5 6 In
holding that no taking had occurred, the Court acknowledged the current
Id.
46.
See generally Basil H. Mattingly, Forum Over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Bal47.
ancing in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 695, 712-15 (2000)
(claiming that the vague language of Pennsylvania Coal's holding "undercuts" Takings
Clause protections); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 97-102 (1995) (positing that "Pennsylvania Coal is a
poorly considered decision that ought to be overruled").
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
48.
See Byrne supra note 47, at 97 for an explanation of the three estates.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 414.
51.
Id. at 416.
52.
Id. at 415.
53.
Id. at 416.
54.
438 U.S. 104, 108-14 (1978) (stating that the Landmarks Preservation Law was in55.
tended to preserve the character of historic buildings and neighborhoods in the city).
Id. at 119.
56.
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lack of any "set formula" for assessing regulatory takings and attempted to
give teeth to the balancing test set out in Pennsylvania Coal by developing
three factors.17 These factors have become synonymous with what is now
known as the Penn Centraltest: 1) the economic impact of the regulation on
the property owner; 2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
the owner's investment-backed expectations; and 3) the character of the
government action."
First, in considering the economic impact of the regulation on the
property owner, the Court made clear that necessity often requires that the
government's actions will have an adverse impact on its citizens." Examples of this include the government's authority to tax or its right to enjoin
certain individual uses of property in order to ensure the health and safety of
a larger community.' In Penn Central,owners of the terminal claimed that
the Landmarks Law disallowed them any economic use of their "air rights"
above the Terminal.6" The Court, however, flatly refuted this understanding
of property rights, stating:
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in
a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. [T]his
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and
on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole ....
.
Next, the Court addressed the issue of an owner's expectations at the
time of purchase and explained that the potential uses of the property would
influence its decision.63 Here, the majority found that the regulation did not
6
interfere with the owner's primary expectation or present property use. 1
The Court cited evidence that it was likely that the owners eventually would
be permitted to build above the terminal with some restrictions.65
Last, with regard to the character of the regulation, the Court explained that takings often occur when regulations act as "acquisitions of re-

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 125.

61.
Id. at 130.
62. Id. at 130-31.
63. Id. at 127-28; but see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (stating
that a property owner's notice of regulation is not an automatic bar to a takings claim: "A
blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes
ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken.").
64.
65.

Penn Central,438 U.S. at 136.
Id. at 136-37.
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sources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions . .""Petitioners
claimed that unlike zoning laws, the Landmarks Law singled out specific
structures for regulation, burdening the owners alone so that an entire community could benefit.67 The majority, however, reasoned that though the
regulation burdens some members of the community more than others, alone
that is not enough to amount to a taking.68 Today, these three factors remain
69
the Court's preferred analysis when addressing regulatory takings cases.
*.".

The Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis decision ushcurrent era of regulatory takings jurisprudence.7 ° In Keystone, a
the
in
ers
case based on strikingly similar facts to those of Pennsylvania Coal, the
regulation at issue was the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act of 1966, which
effectively required fifty percent of the coal to be left in the ground in order
to guarantee stability for surface lands.7 A narrow majority described the
distinction between the Kohler Act and the 1966 Subsidence Act, explaining
that "the Subsidence Act does not merely involve a balancing of the private
economic interests of coal companies against the private interests of the surface owners," but also involves a valid exercise of the state's power to curb
an injurious, noxious use of land that would endanger the community.72 The
Court recalled the fundamental notion that property rights are not without
restrictions and that owners may not use their property in such a way as to
harm others.73 The Court further explained that "the Takings Clause did not
transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the
State asserts its power to enforce it."74
In Keystone, petitioners chose to attack the Subsidence Act on its
face; however, they failed to show that it "denied [them] economically viId. at 128.
66.
Id. at 133; see Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth
67.
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
Penn Central,438 U.S. at 133.
68.
concurring)
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
69.
("The temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted.
The Takings Clause requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context. The court below therefore must consider on remand the array of relevant factors under Penn Centralbefore deciding whether any compensation is due.").
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
70.
Id. at 476-80.
71.

72.

Id. at 485.

Id. at 491-92. Common law tenet "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: Use your
73.
own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." Id. at 492 n.22.
Id. at 491; see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
74.
239 U.S. 394 (1915); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (holding that operation of a
brewery during prohibition, the production of a brickyard within city limits and the presence
of rust-infected red cedar trees, respectively, constituted nuisances even though each activity
was legal before the enactment of the disputed regulations).
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able use of [their] land."7 Petitioners did not prove that their mining operations had been unprofitable as a result of the new Act, but argued instead
that certain segments of their property, namely the coal left in the ground,
had been categorically taken.76 The Court dismissed this interpretation of
property rights, explaining again that property must be regarded "as a
whole" and not as independent portions.77 The Court reasoned, "[W]here
an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one
'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed
in its entirety."78 Four dissenting Justices, however, took issue with the majority's view that there should be no parceling of property rights, saying,
"Unlike many property interests, the 'bundle' of rights in this coal is sparse.79
'For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine it."'
These Justices would have held a taking had occurred.8 °
Until its decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
Court had been reluctant to apply categorical rules to regulatory takings
cases, opting for such application only in situations where physical intrusions occurred or where, as in the case of Lucas, a regulation denied "all
economically beneficial or productive use of land."8 In 1986, developer
David Lucas purchased two lots with the intent to construct single-family
homes, both 300 feet from the beach on a barrier island off the coast of
South Carolina.8 2 In 1988, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which effectively prohibited him from building "occupiable improvements" on those lots.83 Lucas claimed that regardless of the Act's validity and lawfulness, it resulted in a taking of his property without just
compensation.84 The South Carolina Court of Common Pleas agreed, finding that the regulation rendered his property "valueless." 85 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that since Lucas had not challenged
the validity of the Act's purpose to protect the state's beaches, no compensation was required for nuisance prevention.86

75.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
76.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496-97.
77.
Id. at 497; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978).
78.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
79.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922)).
80.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
81.
505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992). See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (explaining that even small physical intrusions warrant
compensation); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (regarding a regulation's denial
of an owner's economically viable use of her land).
82.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.
83.
Id. at 1008-09.
84.
Id. at 1009.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 1010.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss2/12

10

McGee: Real Property/Land Use Law - Keeping Tahoe Blue: An Ecological Al

2003

CASE NOTE

The United States Supreme Court reversed based on the lower
court's finding that Lucas' property was indeed valueless and held: "[W]hen
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."87 The Court rejected the
South Carolina Supreme Court's finding that the state legislature was within
its power to prevent noxious uses of land. 8 The Court explained that the
distinction between regulations that confer benefits and those that prevent
harm is often "in the eye of the beholder," and that if left unchecked, anything could be deemed a nuisance.89 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the
state must prove the existence of such previous common law nuisance restrictions in order to evade paying the requisite compensation.9"
Dissenting Justices noted that the majority's categorical rule was to
be applied only in "extraordinary circumstances" or in the "relatively rare
situation" when a property owner has lost all economically viable use of her
land. 9' As such, Justice Blackmun was critical of the need for a categorical
rule at all, accusing the majority of "launching a missile to kill a mouse."92
He took issue with the majority's attempt to prevent potentially biased nuisance laws (that would feign to prevent harm while actually conferring a
benefit) by acknowledging only pre-existing common-law nuisance. 93 Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, also criticized the majority's categorical
rule as "unsupported by prior decisions, arbitrary and unsound in practice,
and theoretically unjustified." 94 He emphasized that the majority's insistence on pre-existing nuisance laws "effectively freezes the State's common
law, denying the legislature much of its traditional power to revise the law
governing the rights and uses of property."95

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1020-32.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1029-32.
Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1054-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun explains:
Common-law public and private nuisance law is simply a determination
whether a particular use causes harm.... There is nothing magical in the
reasoning of judges long dead. They determined a harm in the same way
th
as state judges and legislatures today. If judges in the 18"' and 19 centuries can distinguish a harm from a benefit, why not judges in the 2 0 th century and if judges can, why not legislators? There simply is no reason to
believe that new interpretations of the hoary common-law nuisance doctrine will be particularly 'objective' or 'value free.'

Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94.
Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens states:
95.
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In First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, California, the Supreme Court did not assess whether a taking had
occurred.96 Rather, its review of the case was based solely on the lower
court's finding that "the remedy for a [regulatory] taking [is limited] to
nonmonetary relief. . . ."" Petitioners in First English were landowners
who, after a flood, were denied the right to rebuild the structures on their
property due to a temporary ordinance that prohibited construction of buildings in "interim flood protection areas."98 Their attempt to recover damages
under inverse condemnation was denied due to the state's law at the time,
which required the courts to find the regulation "excessive in an action for
declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus" before an owner could be compensated for a regulatory taking.99
At the outset, the Court rejected the argument that it must first decide the issue of whether a taking had occurred in order to rule on the issue
of compensation and left the former issue to the lower courts to determine on
remand.'
The holding was simply: "[W]here the government's activities
have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by
the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the
period during which the taking was effective.""'' The Court reasoned that
temporary takings do not differ in their nature from permanent takings, and
therefore require compensation.' °2 The Court limited its holding to the facts
presented: "We ... of course do not deal with the quite different questions
that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before
us.' 0 3 The holding in First English, therefore, rests only on the straightforLegislatures ... must often revise the definition of property and the rights
of property owners. Thus, when the Nation came to understand that slavery was morally wrong and mandated the emancipation of all slaves, it, in
effect, redefined 'property.' On a lesser scale, our ongoing self-education
produces similar changes in the rights of property owners: New appreciation of the significance of endangered species, the importance of wetlands, and the vulnerability of coastal lands, shapes our evolving understanding of property rights.
Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
96.
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
97.
Id. at 311.
98.
Id. at 307 (explaining that County of Los Angeles Interim Ordinance No. 11,855
states: "A person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure,
any portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the interim
flood protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon.").
99.
Id. at 308-09.
100.
Id. at 312-13. On remand, the California court found no taking had occurred. First
English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353
(1989).
101.
FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 321.
102.
Id. at 318.
103.
Id. at 321.
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ward notion that once a taking has decidedly occurred, compensation is the
proper remedy."°4
PRINCIPAL CASE

Although the Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra was based on one
limited question, the implications of its holding are far-reaching and, as the
majority noted, important." 5 The question before the Court was this: Does
the "mere enactment of a temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a
property owner all viable economic use of her property" require treatment as
a categorical taking? 0 6 The Court's answer highlighted reasons for rejecting
a categorical rule in favor of the Penn Central balancing test that supports
"careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances."'' 0 7
The majority's analysis began with a clarification of its holdings in
both Lucas and First English, the two cases upon which petitioners relied
exclusively to bolster their position that application of a categorical rule was
appropriate.'0 8 The Court first emphasized that categorical rules are generally reserved for physical takings cases; however, Lucas represents an exception to that principle."c The reason the Court applied a categorical rule
in Lucas was that it had accepted the finding of the lower court that with the
advent of the regulation, the fee simple estate in question was found to be
completely without value." 0 Another point extrapolated from Lucas was
that in order for a regulatory takings case to warrant a categorical rule, the
property's resulting diminution in value must be 100%, whereas a 95%
diminution would require the application of a Penn Centralanalysis."' The
Court found no correlation between the facts in Lucas in which the value of
property was wholly and permanently "obliterated," and those of TahoeSierra in which any economic use was denied for a 32-month period." 2
Similarly, the Court made it clear that its decision in First English only addressed the "separate remedial question of how compensation is measured
once a regulatory taking is established," not whether an actual taking had
indeed occurred." 3 Ultimately, influenced by its readings of Lucas and First
English, the Court dismissed petitioners' view that "a regulation [that] im-

104. Id. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1482 (2002) (clarifying its holding in FirstEnglish).
105.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1477.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1478 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).

108.

Id. at 1480-84.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1480.
Id. at 1482-83; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483.
Id. at 1482.
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poses a temporary deprivation - no matter how brief - of all economically
4
viable use [is enough] to trigger a per se rule that a taking has occurred.""
The majority also rejected petitioners' argument of "conceptual severance," a notion that a segment of the fee simple estate (in this case a 32month period) can be severed from the whole and "taken in its entirety.""' 5
"Of course, defining the property interest taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged is circular. With property so divided, every delay
would become a total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit process
alike would constitute categorical takings."' 16 The Court noted that it has
"consistently rejected" the approach of considering parcels apart from the
whole." 7 The "starting point," according to the Court, is "to ask whether
there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Central [is] the
proper framework.""' 8
The last portion of the Court's analysis is a response to petitioners'
contention that the Takings Clause was "designed to bar Government from
forcing some people to bear burdens alone, which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.""' 9 The Court responded by considering seven possible alternatives to its decision and explained why none
of them would have been appropriate. 20 The first four of the seven theories
were dismissed at the outset due to the procedural posture of the case.' The
three remaining theories involved the application of some kind of categorical
rule: 1) a rule that would compensate owners "whenever government temporarily deprives [them] of all economically viable use of [their] property;" 2)
a "narrower rule" encompassing "all temporary land-use restrictions except
those 'normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like;"' or 3) a compromise of sorts in which a
fixed time period of perhaps one year could be established such that during
that time no compensation would be required,
but after that time had ex22
pired, compensation would be compulsory.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
unable
"series

Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1483.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1483-84.
Id. at 1486 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
Id. The Court simply was not presented with any of these arguments and thus was
to consider them: 1) the characterization of TRPA's consecutive regulations as a
of rolling moratoria," the "functional equivalent of a permanent taking;" 2) the possibility that TRPA acted in bad faith, essentially "stalling" in order to avoid finishing the regional plan; 3) the argument that "the moratoria did not substantially advance a legitimate
state interest;" and 4) petitioners' option to challenge the moratoria under the Penn Central
test, not just on their face. Id.
122.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
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The Court rejected the possibility of creating a new, sweeping categorical rule (like that identified above as number one) for three reasons. On
a functional level, it first was concerned that a rule requiring "compensation
for every delay in the use of property would render routine government
processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmaking."' 23
Next, it explained that if a change in the law were appropriate, it would be
the legislature's responsibility to do so. 24 Finally, the Court reiterated that
regulations that deprive property owners of temporary use of their property
are best analyzed under the Penn Central balancing test, and that the out'
come will depend on "the particular circumstances [in each] case."125
The Court further abandoned any notion of adopting either of the
more narrow rules (numbers two and three mentioned above) for similar
functional reasons. Citing the fact that moratoria like the ones at issue in
Tahoe-Sierra "are used widely among land-use planners to preserve the
status quo while formulating a more permanent development strategy," the
Court was not willing to impose a categorical rule, even a less harsh one, due
to the financial burden it would impose on planning agencies acting in good
faith. 2 6 Additionally, if moratoria are not protected as part of the community planning process, incentives would be created for landowners "to develop their property quickly before a comprehensive plan can be enacted,
thereby fostering inefficient and ill-conceived growth."' 27 Even though the
Court acknowledged that moratoria that last for more than one-year may be
"viewed with special skepticism," the creation of a rule specific to length of
time appropriate for moratoria is a job more aptly reserved for state lawmakers. 2' Thus, the Court was steadfast in its decision to affirm the Penn Central balancing test as the appropriate analysis for regulatory takings cases.
In the dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, took issue with several fundamental points. First, the
dissenting Justices contested the fact that the length of the moratorium was
only 32-months, positing that because TRPA's 1984 Plan was the proximate
cause of the later court injunction, the moratorium actually lasted six
years. 29 While this "novel theory of causation was not briefed, nor was it
discussed in oral argument," the new six-year figure played a central role in
the dissent's next conclusion that there should be no distinction between

123.
Id. at 1485.
124.
Id. The Court explains: "Such an important change in the law should be the product
of legislative rulemaking rather than adjudication." Id.
125.
Id. at 1486 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,168 (1958))).
126. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1487.
127.
Id. at 1488.
128.
Id. at 1489. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1489 n.37 (citing the list of state legislatures that have already enacted these laws).
129.
Id. at 1490-91 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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temporary and permanent takings. 13' The dissent reasoned that the "Lucas
rule is derived from the fact that a 'total deprivation of use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation."""' The
final point of contention (acknowledged by Justices Thomas and Scalia in a
separate, dissenting opinion) was a criticism of the majority's understanding
of the "denominator" issue. 2 According to these Justices, the proper denominator should not be the "land's infinite life," but one that would allow
3 3 In other words, private
for a taken "temporal slice" to be compensable.
property owners should be able to claim that a taking occurs (requiring compensation) whenever a regulation prohibits them from temporarily developing their property.
ANALYSIS

In the wake of Tahoe-Sierra, property rights advocates will lament
that the Court missed another opportunity to adopt a more coherent body of
law by eschewing a categorical rule in favor of the Penn Central balancing
test. A categorical rule inevitably would have remedied some uncertainty
within regulatory takings jurisprudence, but only at the expense of "fairness
and justice" to the public at large, a cost that environmental advocates are
In this difficult area of law,
thankful the Court was unwilling to assume.'
where advocates for both property rights and environmental issues are ill at
ease with the current state of regulatory takings jurisprudence, only one
thing is clear: The Penn Centralbalancing test is now firmly established as
the Court's chosen method for assessing regulatory takings.
Many environmentalists undoubtedly are in a quandary about the
Penn Central test. Certainly, it is preferable to a categorical rule in analyzing whether or not an environmental regulation constitutes a taking because
Id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 1474 n.8 (stating the majority's as130.
sessment of the dissent's causation theory).
131. Id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992)).
132. Id. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 135-38 and accompanying
text for a more detailed discussion of the denominator.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argues:
133.
I write separately to address the majority's conclusion that the temporary
moratorium at issue here was not a taking because it was not a 'taking of
the parcel as a whole. . . .' I had thought that First English put to rest the
notion that the 'relevant denominator' is the land's infinite life. Consequently, a regulation effecting a total deprivation of the use of a so-called
'temporal slice' of property is compensable ... unless background principles of state property law prevent it from being deemed a taking ....
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1489 ("We conclude, therefore, that the interest in 'fairness and justice' will be
best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this,
rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule.").
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the Penn Centraltest at least attempts to balance all the factors in the case at
hand. Moreover, when the Court implements the Penn Central test, it will
often focus on the third prong of the test (the character of the government
regulation) and uphold the regulation, even if the property owner has shown
investment backed expectations and substantial economic impact."' For
some in the environmental community then, Penn Centralis a sufficient test
even with its shortcomings, and Tahoe-Sierra signifies a victory. Others
would argue, as this author does, that given the new and increasing environmental threats facing the United States today, Penn Central is not the proper
framework within which to analyze regulatory takings and a different approach is necessary.
(a) Criticisms of the Penn Central Test Abound
The Penn Central test has been criticized for the ambiguous nature
of its first two prongs. The first prong (the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner) has two inherent problems. First, the Court continues to disagree about how to calculate the impact. The equation the Court
uses is a simple fraction with the numerator being the value of the property
right taken, but the Court remains split over the proper denominator to use.136
The denominator is the value of the pre-taking property with which the taken
portion will be compared.' The majority in Tahoe-Sierra affirmed the general rule that the value of the "parcel as a whole" should act as the denominator."3 The dissent, however, would allow conceptual severance, which in

135.
See generally Basil H. Mattingly, Forum Over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 695, 699 (2000) (explaining that "the property owner is unlikely to prevail under the 'balancing' test").
136. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)
(citing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967)). The Court
states:
Because our test for regulatory takings requires us to compare the value
that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the
property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the
unit of property 'whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.'

Id.
137.
The denominator problem is contentious because anything less than a total taking
(with the fraction being 1/1) will be analyzed under the Penn Central test, whereas total takings qualify under the categorical rule of Lucas. For a more in depth treatment of the denominator problem, see Dwight H. Merriam, What is the Relevant Parcel in Takings Litigation?, SC43 ALI-ABA 505 (1998); John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthingthe Denominator in
Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHi. L. REV. 1535 (1994); Benjamin Allee, Note, Drawing
the Line in Regulatory Takings Law: How a Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the DenominatorProblem, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1957 (2002).
138.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1481. A criticism of the "parcel as a whole" approach is
that with the denominator so broadly defined, the taken portion of the property will rarely
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turn would provide for compensation whenever a segment is "taken" (even
temporarily) in its entirety.' 39 After the Court determines the proper
denominator to use and attempts to quantify a "value lost," the second
4 The Court will
problem arises: Economic impact alone is not controlling.
not necessarily find a taking has occurred simply upon a showing of a
certain amount of monetary loss.' 4 ' Past cases have shown that even if the
142
In
owner stands to lose millions, a taking does not automatically result.
fact, economic impact may be somewhat misleading due to the importance
the Court places on the property rights that remain in the entire parcel after
enactment of a regulation. These traditional rights, such as the right to exclude others and to devise the property (both difficult to quantify in mone"strands in the
tary terms) have proven to be equally important to show
43 that
abrogated.
been
not
have
rights
bundle" remain and all
The investment-backed expectations prong of the test is similarly
problematic. 44 At times, this prong has stood for a property owner's expec145
Antation of some kind of profit or reasonable return on her investment.
equal the entire fee simple. Total takings do not occur if some value or rights remain in the
property.
139. Id. at 1496. (Thomas, J., dissenting). A problem with conceptual severance is that
when the denominator is so narrowly construed, any regulation restricting a property right
theoretically results in a taking.
See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("It is, to be sure, undeniable that the
140.
regulations here prevent the most profitable use of appellees' property. Again, however, that
is not dispositive. When we review [a] regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not
necessarily equated with a taking."). See also Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993). "[M]ere diminution in the
value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking." Id.
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 116 (1978) (ex141.
plaining that owners stood to make three million dollars a year in rent from the proposed 55story office building development).
Id.
142.
143. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate
or devise the protected birds.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)
(explaining that "[iln this case, we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation").
See Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and
144.
Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REv. 91, 107 (1995) ("The net
outcome of all the Court's efforts [to expound on what actually constitutes an 'investmentbacked expectation'] is that the meaning of the phrase remains uncertain, rendering its effectiveness as a legal doctrine questionable at best.").
Id. at 106-07.
145.
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other way the Court has defined these expectations is to explain that a property owner might reasonably expect that her property would be subject to
some government-imposed limitations.'46 The problem with this line of
thinking, however, is:
The expectations of the property owner that a change in legislation might or might not occur... are utterly irrelevant to
takings law. Provided it stays within the constraints of the
police power, the government clearly has the power and the
right to amend a regulation if it so wishes, regardless of
whether the amendment is . . . expected by the affected
property owner. On the other hand, even a completely foreseeable regulatory change, if it exceeds the bounds of police
power, is impermissible.' 47
A scholar who would compel the Court to use concrete economic theory
rather than legal theory to interpret this prong acknowledges that the current
descriptive "investment-backed expectations" is "analytically impoverished
and must be subjected to quantitative economic analysis to infuse clarity into
otherwise jumbled strings of words."' 48 Thus, for a number of reasons, critics have called for a reformation of this prong.
From the position of a property rights advocate, the Court's attention
to the first two prongs is often just an "empty ritual" before it utilizes its true
test, Penn Central'sthird prong: An evaluation of the character of the government regulation.'49 Even for proponents of an environmental regulation
who are not unhappy with the result of a typical Penn Centralanalysis (such
that the government regulation is upheld and the Court finds that no taking
has occurred) it would seem that a new test is warranted. Indeed, if only one
prong is to be dispositive, then pretending that the entire test is truly valuable leaves little faith in the Court's chosen analysis.

146.
147.
148.
dence,

Id.atlll-12.
Id. at 114-15.
William W. Wade, Penn Central'sEconomic Failings Confounded Takings Jurispru31 URB. LAW. 277, 298 (1999).
Economists have characterized investments in terms of expectations regarding the timing, magnitude, and riskiness of outflows and inflows ....
Therefore, the economic value of an investment is the present worth of
the flow of future returns discounted at the investor's opportunity cost of
capital, i.e., what he would expect to earn from the investment someplace
else.

Id. at 298-99.
149.
See Basil H. Mattingly, Forum Over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing in
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 695 (2000).
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An EcologicalAlternative: ExpandingNuisance Law to Encompass Harm to
the Environment
The Penn Centraltest is not the only avenue by which courts can assess takings claims that challenge environmentally protective regulations. A
better analysis inheres in the doctrine of public nuisance, defined as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public."' 50 The
Court's current focus on the third prong of the Penn Central balancing test
makes this leap from a balancing test to a nuisance paradigm a small one.
As the Court assesses the nature of the government regulation, it is effectively examining the validity of the state's police power. Environmental or
land use planning regulations that are proven to prevent harm to publicly
shared natural resources simply should fall under a common law nuisance
analysis. This concept is not without precedent. Property has always been
held under the caveat that its use must not threaten the health, safety, and
welfare of the public. 5'
Rights to property exist only if recognized by law.' The Court has
explained: "[N]ot all economic interests are 'property rights'; only those
economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them, and only
when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion."'5 Consequently, as
property rights change in response to society's values, so, too, should common law nuisance adapt to reflect the acceptable limitation on one's property
use.154

While the framework of public nuisance is not new, an ecological
nuisance paradigm would require progressive thought and legislative action.
Given the Court's holding in Lucas, it is imperative that nuisance laws encompassing environmental degradation be in existence before the land use
planning regulation is challenged on takings grounds.' Ecological nuisance

150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §8211B (1977).
See David S. Wilgus, Comment, The Nature of Nuisance: Judicial Environmental
151.
Ethics and Landowner Stewardship in the Age of Ecology, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 99, 120
(2001).
J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine,
152.

22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 89, 116-17 (1995) (explaining that the emancipation of slaves, the abolition of a husband's property right over his wife's estate and the destruction of riparian water
rights in the west are examples of how property rights have changed over time).
153. Id. at 115 (quoting United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502
(1945)).
154. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (7th ed. 1999). Public nuisance is defined as "[a]n
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public, such as a condition
dangerous to health, offensive to community moral standards, or unlawfully obstructing the
public in the free use of public property." Id.
155. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). The Court
explained:
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laws would regard long-term land use planning as an appropriate vehicle for
protecting the environmental health of communities. These laws inevitably
would take precedence over short-term, individual economic gain and would
limit certain property uses. The strength of a nuisance paradigm is its potential for flexibility and local control. This flexibility would allow legislatures
to "set standards of right and wrong" and could be "easily tailored to the
peculiarities of a given place."' 56 Thus, building a vacation home would not
usually constitute a nuisance unless the development was prohibited in cases
such as Lake Tahoe, where it threatened the health of a community's shared
57
natural resource.1
An inevitable criticism of the public nuisance doctrine is the malleable nature of the so-called "harm/benefit test."' 58 The traditional understanding is that "[g]ovemmental actions intended to confer benefits are exercises of the eminent domain power; governmental actions intended to prevent harm are exercises of the police power."' 59 Arguably, any environmental regulation simultaneously confers benefits and prevents harm, and
the point at which the scales tip to one side or the other is based on a court's
subjective value judgment."' ° One commentator has suggested that this
problem can be resolved and a property owner's rights can be safeguarded
by the addition of a substantive due process analysis.' 6' This analysis would
examine: 1) the legitimacy of the government interest; 2) whether the regu-

We emphasize that to win its case South Carolina must do more than
proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as [use your own property in such a man-

ner as not to injure that of another] .... Instead, as it would be required

to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance
and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found.
Id.
156.

Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and PrivateLand, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631, 656

(1996).
157. If a property owner was left with a 100% diminution in property value, it is still possible he or she could claim a categorical taking under a Lucas analysis. Since this is a relatively rare occurrence, however, it would be more likely that the challenged regulation (now
addressed by the Penn Centraltest) could be considered using ecological nuisance laws.
158. See Oswald, supra note 143, at 139-43 (advocating for "resurrecting the correct regulatory takings analysis").
159. Id. at 139-40.
160. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024 ("One could say that imposing a servitude on Lucas'
land is necessary in order to prevent his use of it from 'harming' South Carolina's ecological
resources; or, instead, in order to achieve the 'benefits' of an ecological preserve.").
161.
Oswald, supra note 143, at 143-44 (explaining the means-ends test for police power
set out in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), which includes a consideration of the
interests of the public, analysis of whether the means to accomplish that end are reasonable
and a determination of whether individuals are unduly oppressed).
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lation is a reasonable means by which to further the government's interest;
62
and 3) whether this interest outweighs the property owner's burden.1 In
cases where the interests proffered by the government regulation fall short of
overcoming the burden to a property owner, or are proven not to be a reasonable means to the governmental end, the regulation would be struck
down. Alternatively, if the regulation passes this balancing test, then property owners would receive no compensation.
Two Theories Support a Nuisance Framework:Reciprocity of Advantage
and Land Stewardship
Reciprocity of advantage is a theory founded on the "presumption
that mutual restrictions on property use can enhance the total welfare of the
affected landowners. Governmental regulation of land use is thereby justi63
fied by the reciprocal benefits that accrue to the burdened individuals."'
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes mentioned reciprocity of advantage
in Pennsylvania Coal, and this concept has appeared in numerous regulatory
6
takings cases ever since." This theory supports the contention that on its
face the Penn Central test weighs too heavily on the side of the property
owner's economic impact, while not focusing enough on the fact that the
regulation also might confer a benefit, thus eliminating the need for compensation."' It also favors a broader interpretation of common law nuisance
activities . . . produces
because "[r]egulation of an owner's ' nuisance-like
66
advantages."'
direct, in-kind reciprocal
Belief in a land stewardship model also compels environmentalists
and progressively minded property scholars to support an expanded nuisance
162.

Id. at 144.

Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a
163.
New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence,40 AM. U. L. REV. 297, 302 (1990).
Id. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (distinguishing a
164.
the
previous holding in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) in which

Court upheld the legislature's decision to allow coal to be left in the ground. The Court ex-

secured
plains that in Plymouth: "[It] was a requirement for the safety of employees ... and
various
an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification of
491
470,
U.S.
480
DeBenedictis,
v.
Ass'n
Coal
laws."). See also Keystone Bituminous
the
preserving
of
ways
primary
State's
the
of
one
government,
of
system
our
(1987) ("Under
is
us
of
each
While
property.
their
public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of
are
that
restrictions
the
from
greatly
benefit
turn,
in
we,
burdened somewhat by restrictions,
placed on others.").
165. Coletta, supra note 162, at 302. As Mr. Coletta explains:
[These regulations] do not give rise to a takings challenge either because
it is thought that benefits outweigh burdens and the regulations are, therefore, within the penumbra of substantive due process, or, alternatively,
that the benefits that accrue from the regulations provide the necessary
compensation to satisfy fifth amendment guarantees.

Id.
166.

Coletta, supra note 162, at 356-57.
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framework. The land stewardship theory is founded on Aldo Leopold's envisioned land ethic, which, although described over fifty years ago, is even
more relevant today. Leopold urged people to regard land less as a thing to
be owned and more as part of a community to be treated responsibly and
carefully.167 A stewardship model does not seek to eliminate private land
ownership, but simply strives to acknowledge that property owners should
accept the limitations on their property rights and use their land within those
ecological and social parameters that benefit the public as a whole.
The brief mention of these two theories is important in order to give
some philosophical context to the notion of an ecological nuisance framework. For a majority of citizens to support what some might call radical
legislation, a change in thinking is necessary. 68 The reciprocity of advantage theory and a land stewardship model support an expansion of nuisance
law as a legal alternative to regulatory takings challenges now addressed
under the Penn Central test. Physical takings and regulations that deny
owners all economically viable use of their property could still be challenged
using a categorical rule. Ecological nuisance laws, however, would be the
preferred standard for addressing environmental and land use regulations
that simply limited private property use. The presence of state laws describing ecological nuisance would give agencies the freedom to regulate uses of
land and the ability to better respond to the threats facing this country's natural resources. Equally important, such laws would provide the backdrop
against which government infringement of private property rights could equitably be measured.
CONCLUSION
The use of a nuisance analysis to determine the validity of the police
power in promulgating environmental regulations has several strengths over
the Penn Central test. First, it draws on existing common law nuisance
principles, which offer continuity within regulatory takings jurisprudence.
Second, like Penn Central,it incorporates the beneficial aspect of balancing
by using a substantive due process analysis so that unique situations are
given an opportunity for exception. This framework would not preclude a
consideration of economic impact on the owner as a court could consider
that impact along with the other "burdens." Third, it would honestly and
167.

ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC

201-26 (Oxford University Press 1989)

(1949). "We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see
land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect." Id.
at viii.
168. Property rights advocates will likely challenge the notion of an ecological nuisance
paradigm on the grounds that constitutionally protected property rights will be lost. Undoubtedly, property rights will change, as they have done throughout the course of this country's
history. It has been the role of the states to define the limits of those rights. See Byrne supra
note 151, at 116-17 (citing examples in which certain property rights were abolished by force
of law).
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clearly apprise landowners of the limitations on their property rights without
instilling hope that economic impact or investment-backed expectations
would be weighed equally with the character of the government regulation.
Finally, and as this case note suggests, most importantly, a nuisance analysis
benefits the environment by allowing agencies the freedom to regulate on
behalf of the environment without the threat of takings claims litigation.
LISA DARDY MCGEE
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